Random Notes Regarding PA
(1) When the
”accounts” for, e.g. the laws of logic, he often states that these laws
are an intrinsic part of, and only of, the ”nature” of the Christian
God. This is self-refuting since the concept ”nature” presuppose that
”it is itself; that it is something; that is has boundaries; etc”,
i.e., it presupposes the law of identity. So, this is the ”stolen
(2) Furthermore, if ”A is
A” is an intrinsic part of, and only of, the Christian God it would be
self-refuting to state: (i) ”A is A” and (ii) ”God does not exist”;
(compare with the statement ”this sentence does not exist” which is
obviously false since it presupposes existence). However, this can only
be true if there is a valid ontological argument for God. (It seems (to
me) that presuppositionalism is rooted in the ontological argument.)
(3) Also, if it would be true
that ”A is A” is a part of, and only of, the Christian God, it would
still make logic subjective since these laws would be dependent upon a
”nature”. (And since this ”nature” is not absolute (which would require
a valid ontological argument) the laws would also not be absolute...)
(4) The question: ”Can you be
wrong about everything?” can only can be answered with ”No!”. A ”Yes!”
would be self-refuting since it would also be a knowledge claim. But,
according to the statement itself, you might be wrong about that. In
which case the statement would be false...
(5) The same would go for
the question: ”Can a fact be revealed in the future that falsifies all
A ”Yes!” would imply that this ”fact” would falsify the statement
itself, which is self-refuting.
(6) The TAG-argument seems to
be based on a false dichotomy between ”material”and ”concept”. The
question is then ”What is God?”; either it is ”material” or a
”concept”. Neither is good for the Christian worldview.
Both Bahnsen and Slick has to put God into another ”category”, which,
of course, refutes their dichotomy.
Bahnsen does it in his debate with George H. Amith:
and Slick does it in his debate with Dillahunty:
(7) Ask the PA: ”Can God make
you feel absolutely certain that ”X” is true (false), while it actually
is false (true)?”
One possible answer (from Scott Terry): ”We know He is not
lying,because He tell us He's not.”
Now ask the PA: ”How do you know that this was not a lie?”
One possible answer (from Ted Curtis): ”The power to facilitate
conditions such that an omnipotent being cannot lie, is an additional
power to posses. Its actually ”greater” to have this ”power” than it is
to not have this power, so an omnipotent being must necessarily have
A possible rebuttal would be: It would follow from your ”reasoning”,
Ted, that a being which would have ”the power to facilitate conditions”
so that He cannot do X for EVERY element X in the infinite set of all
the things that this being already can do, must be - not only a
”greater” being than you puny Christian god - but the GREATEST being
since He has an INFINITE amount of ”added abilities”. An omnipotent
being would therefore, necessarily, be THIS being, i.e., a being which
contains not only one violation of the law of non-contradiction (”can
lie & cannot lie”) but an INFINITE amount of violations of the law
(”can X & cannot X). Even though it is enough with one violation of
the law to know that your god is bs, it is still funny though to
realise that your ”reasoning” leads to the fact that TRUE omnipotence
involves being both omnipotent and non-omnipotent at the same time!
(8) Assume that X is a foundational truth. If so, then ~X will
give rise to one explicit claim (e) that refutes one (or several)
implicit claims (i). The following axioms are foundational:
E: Existence (something) is.
Assume ~E: Nothing is.
~E(e): Nothing is.
~E(i): The claim ~E(e) is. => ~E(i) <=> ~~E(e) <=> E(e)
Ergo, ~E <=> E(e)^~E(e) (contradiction).
=> E is a foundational truth.
I: Each existent is itself.
(A is A)
Assume ~I: Each existent is not itself.
~I(e): Each existent is not itself.
~I(i): The claim ~I(e) is itself => ~I(i) <=> ~~I(e)
Ergo, ~I <=> I(e)^~I(e) (contradiction).
=> I is a foundational truth.
C: I am
conscious of that which exists.
Assume ~C: I am not conscious of that which exists.
~C(e): I am not conscious of that which exists.
~C(i): I must be consciouss of the claim ~C(e). => ~C(i)
<=> ~~C(e) <=> C(e)
Ergo, ~C <=> C(e)^~C(e) (contradiction).
=> C is a foundational truth.
Conclusion: E, I, and C are foundational truths.